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Archaeology, Anthropology and the Stuff of Time 
Lucas’ discussion of contemporaneity makes an important contribution to archaeological 
understandings of chronology and dating and to broader debates about temporality. Extending his 
earlier work on time (Buchli and Lucas 2001; Lucas 2001; Lucas 2005), Lucas’ central insight is that 
contemporaneity is not a function of a shared unit of time but of the specific relations through which 
objects are imbricated. The approach is likely to have profound implications for archaeological 
approaches to chronology. Whether or not it undermines the current preoccupation with absolute 
dating, it should certainly give renewed impetus to those branches of archaeology that make it 
possible to examine time as a matter of the specific material properties of artefacts. This is 
important, firstly, because it opens-up the possibility of more nuanced empirical understanding of 
the very stuff of time (literally how it is materially manifest) and, secondly, because such empirical 
understandings enable conceptual refinement and extension of the categories through which time is 
understood. Of broader interest for non-archaeological readers, are the ramifications of this 
discussion of contemporaneity for the ways in which time is investigated and conceptualised. 
Writing as an anthropologist, interested but with no expertise in archaeological dating, it is these 
latter considerations that I want to pursue in my comments, as these relate to contemporaneity and 
to the broader investigation of time.  
Lucas’ move to situate contemporaneity as a relative property of the objects of investigation opens 
up the possibility of an archaeology that is of rather than simply in time. Rather than an external 
determining system (what Lucas terms the ‘envelope concept’), time is a product of the relations 
between things and is therefore contingent and relative to the object(s) of investigation. In an 
influential paper in this journal, Ingold (2007) argues for a shift from materiality to materials, 
suggesting that a focus on material culture was accompanied by a generic concern with the material 
world, entailing a dualistic opposition to (immaterial) society, and foreclosing attention to the actual, 
specific and processual properties of materials. I read Lucas’ paper as a parallel move, insofar as this 
urges a shift away from universal understandings of temporality as an abstract, determining 
principle (independent of people and place) to the actual, specific and multiple ways in which time is 
produced; time against temporality, to paraphrase Ingold, is materially and socially situated, 
emergent rather than pre-given as a universal organising principle.  
This theoretical move resonates with recent anthropological discussions of time at a number of 
levels. While temporality has been a longstanding focus of anthropological interest, at least from the 
time of Evans-Pritchard, recent commentators have pointed to the ways in which anthropological 
models and methods internalise assumptions about time, to the detriment of empirical investigation 
of the actual relations and understandings through which time is constituted. Informed in part by 
post-human thinking this entails a move from the study of socially constructed representations of 
time, to an understanding of time as a distributed property of the relations between people and 
things as they interact in practice (Bear 2014; Ingold 2010). In terms that echo Lucas’, this approach 
proposes that the situated investigation of these temporal practices conditions the analytic 
framework rather than vice-versa (Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2013). Theoretically speaking, new 
temporal understandings are continually extended and reconfigured through ethnographic 
encounters with temporal contexts that, in their specificity, call for conceptual refinement. New 
theories of time are produced through taking seriously the specificity of these ethnographic 
articulations. If time is always something different – differently specified in different situations – its 
conceptual implications are always, recursively, a challenge to theoretical models derived from 
elsewhere. Rabinow’s influential calls for an anthropology of the contemporary in some ways echo 
Lucas’ approach in this paper, suggesting that we approach this not as an analytic or methodological 
given but as 'an assemblage of both old and new elements and their interactions and interfaces’;  as 
‘a moving ratio of modernity, moving through the recent past and near future in a (non-linear) 
space’ (2014: 142).). 
These resonances might lead us to imagine disciplinary convergence, specifically in an approach to 
time that, in attending to articulations of people and things, collapses any straightforward 
conceptual separation between its social and material determinants. Indeed, attempts to elucidate 
the temporality of materials and the materiality of time represent an exciting arena of mutual 
interest if not as yet much collaborative research, across archaeology, anthropology and other 
disciplines (Ingold 2010) However if time is a relative property of practical interactions, indissolubly 
social and material, Lucas’ account itself makes clear how disciplinary traditions of fieldwork and 
analysis (re)produce their own temporal frameworks, as much as they can be used to understand 
the temporal logics inherent in the practices of others.  Insofar as what we know about time relates 
to how we know about it, time matters to archaeology and anthropology in literally different ways.  
As Lucas highlights, chronology creates various issues for archaeologists: insofar as contemporaneity 
becomes a matter of temporal coincidence, attention to processually unfolding relations is 
foreshortened. Ethnographic methods also routinely engender and reproduce assumptions about 
contemporaneity but in rather different ways. Dalsgaard and Nielsen (2013) have recently 
highlighted how, notwithstanding the turn to multi-sited ethnography, anthropological definitions 
and demarcations of the field as a temporally bounded unit foreclose attention to the multiple 
temporalities at play as unfolding properties of interactions in the field. From the perspective of the 
‘ethnographic present’, time is effectively collapsed into place, even as conceptions of place are 
distributed and extended to encompass non-localised processes. If time poses different kinds of 
problem for archaeologists and anthropologists, these disciplines also create different kinds of 
‘solutions’, insofar as different interpretive and methodological practices create different 
interpretive artefacts.  
I read Lucas’ discussion of contemporaneity not only as a critique of the temporal assumptions 
embedded in prevailing archaeological approaches, but also as a more positive explication and 
amplification of  existing archaeological disposition. His account makes clear a latent capacity of 
archaeological research to unfold time from the material properties of artefacts and the ways in 
which they are spatially related. The question of whether and how things are contemporary is thus a 
matter of empirical investigation. Lucas and others have elsewhere made evident through 
discussions of the ‘contemporary past’, how, regardless of the object of investigation, the 
archaeological method inheres in sustained empirical attention to the physical properties of things. 
Archaeological orientations to these questions are not just a matter of theoretical perspective but of 
the distinctively embodied ‘skilled visions’ (Grasseni 2007) – methodologies practically embodied as 
sensibilities, dispositions, ways of interacting, knowing and seeing. Archaeology, thus conceived, is 
less a practice of putting things in temporal context, than of making time out of things. In relation to 
the current discussion, this means that time is made visible through space, and hence materials are 
methodologically prior to time. Such a perspective helps locate the limits of the kinds of 
contextualising moves that anthropologists routinely engage in.  
Lucas’ reformulated vision of archaeological contemporaneity makes clear, by contrast, the 
materially and temporally reductive consequences of a commitment to the ethnographic present, 
and foregrounds a broader problem latent in a range of sociological perspectives: even where the 
temporal horizon is extended to embrace past and future, these emerge after the fact of the primary 
object of attention: methods and analytic concepts that privilege contemporary social relations and 
interests, locate past and present as various kinds of projection from this, whether conceived in 
terms of temporal ‘imaginations’, ‘representations’, or ‘memories’ . The past as a reflex of present 
interests leads both to an attenuated understanding of the historical process, and of the ways in 
which time is materially embodied (Jones and Yarrow 2013). In the context of anthropological 
discussions of heritage, Christoph Brumann suggests that conceptual frameworks that privilege 
contemporary social relations and interests render historic artefacts as ‘empty signifiers’ (in press), 
whose material properties participate obliquely if at all in the meanings that are (socially) made of 
them. Some time ago Marilyn Strathern (1990) highlighted how the anthropological move to put 
artefacts in social and historical context, forecloses consideration of the temporal contexts that 
artefacts themselves contain. Ingold (2010) has made a related point about the ways artefacts 
enfold time, as much as they are enfolded within it. Yet even if such conceptual insights have 
accompanied renewed anthropological attention to the material ‘stuff’ of which time is literally 
made, ethnographic approaches continue to situate this interest through fieldwork that routinely 
privileges the spoken words and practical interactions of people. My point is not to suggest that this 
is problematic per se, but that it locatetes the question of what time is and how we can understand 
it. Even if anthropologists are increasingly committed to conceptual frameworks that highlight how 
time is folded into things, it remains the case that our interests have rarely been accompanied by the 
kinds of expertise that would allow us to investigate these dynamics with anything like the 
sophistication of archaeological research. Lucas’ discussion is a useful reminder to anthropologists of 
the interpretive limits that ethnographic investigation imposes, and of the ways in which these 
necessarily locate our understandings of time in general and of the contemporary in particular.  
My comments so far have attempted to draw out the reflexive implications of Lucas’ discussion of 
time in archaeology, for anthropological enquiry. In my final comments I want to suggest that 
anthropological approaches to time might in turn help to locate some conceptual limits of the 
approach Lucas espouses. For Lucas temporality is a product of ‘things in relation to one another’ 
and from this perspective contemporaneity is conceptualised as a matter of ‘how temporality is 
bound to an object's identity and how it mediates its relation to other objects.' (12). This ‘ANT view 
of consociality’, may, as Lucas contends, have the benefit of enabling a more spatially and 
temporally distributed understanding of the person. One can certainly see how the approach makes 
sense in relation to archaeological methodologies that routinely route interpretive relations through 
things.  Writing as an anthropologist and ethnographer, however the approach seems in some 
respects to narrow the interpretive possibilities for tracing relations, insofar as these becomes 
primarily if not exclusively a question of action, and ‘things’ become their primary locus. Paul 
Rabinow and Anthony Stavrianakis have recently suggested that in actor-network theory 
approaches, '... the range of affectation that is open to actants, human and otherwise, consists 
entirely and uniquely of one type of action, which ultimately is a kind of mechanics in its insistence 
that all phenomena can be explained by a micro- and macrophysics of action.' (71). Lucas’ 
formulation of contemporaneity borrows explicitly from ANT approaches and seems to imply a 
similar ‘physics of action’. From a more ethnographic perspective, one might then wonder about the 
range of ways in which relations of contemporaneity can be defined and understood. While Lucas is 
right to highlight how the material properties of artefacts and assemblages themselves participate in 
these meanings, relationships of contemporaneity are also and indissolubly a product how of how 
people think about, talk about and conceptualise these. Contemporaneity involves relationships 
between objects, and Lucas’ account makes evident how  archaeologists are be uniquely placed to 
draw out the relational implications of their material properties. However contemporaneity  can also 
be seen as a function of the various ways in which people narrate and conceptualise their relations 
with one another and with the non-human elements of the worlds they inhabit.  
While Lucas is himself keen to open ways of tracing temporal relations, the invocation of ANT 
therefore seems in some ways to work against this aim. My broader point is not simply to highlight 
the diverse ways in which temporal relations – and hence contemporaneity – can be traced, but also 
to foreground the extent to which the specification of relations will always be relatively to the 
conceptual framework/s with which one starts. Here my comments rejoin and extend Lucas’ paper 
in drawing attention to the situated nature of our own interpretive artefacts. An archaeologist 
examining contemporaneity as a matter of ‘things in relation to one another’ might produce a 
different sense of the contemporary, to an anthropologist whose ethnographic sensibilities make 
her more attuned to relations made through spoken words, or the everyday interactions of people. 
What we know about time is situated by how we know about it – by the kinds of sensibilities, visions 
and interpretive frameworks we employ as much as the theories and concepts. Anthropology and 
archaeology do not look at the same world differently – they make the world available to themselves 
in qualitatively different kinds of ways. From this perspective, timeis not so much a shared object, as 
a shared set of interests. Each discipline constitutes a perspective on the other that helps to locate 
and define these limits. As such anthropology and archaeology’s mutual interests – in time in general 
and the contemporary in particular -- lies as much in how these disciplines differ as in what they 
share.  
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